The Media’s Accountability

Boehlert’s Lapdogs raises some very interesting even disturbing questions regarding the way the media conducted itself during the days preceding the war on Iraq, and earlier part of the actual conflict. The media seemed too eager to repeat information strategically spoon fed by the White House, too timid and naïve to express any real cynicism or concern over the legitimacy of the war, and intentionally left out information that would indicate that significant opposition existed. Thus, they became coconspirators with the Bush administration inadvertently adopting the propagandistic and even deceptive way of relaying information to the public that lead them into supporting an unnecessary war.

The real question is not what caused the media to behave so uncharacteristically, and abandon its generally more cynical critical approach to our government, because really the media was doing what it does best-- telling people they wanted to hear.
Media scholars, analysts and researchers tend to agree that the role the media assumes in our society is not that of public advocating, and neither is it that of objective truth seeking; rather it functions to raise profits just like any other business or industry does. Eric Boehlert laments the media for being negligent in its role “… to accurately inform citizens, particularly during times of great national interest”( see more here), but such noble incentives do not exist in the first place. The de facto state of the media is most evident when the quest for truth comes in conflict with its need to maximize profit; the media’s chief concern quickly becomes that of the latter.

Thus, it is important to note the audience the media was catering during the days preceding the War on Iraq, or better phrased for our purposes- the aftermath of 9/11. Since Pearl Harbor, over a half a century ago, Americans had not experienced an attack of such magnitude on its own soil. The disheartened but angry, terror stricken but vengeance –wanting emotions and sentiments had not fully faded. Patriotism continued to soar, and people still looked to rally behind a strong leader who’d do more than provide the public with morale building rhetoric; one who promised action. Public trust and support of the government was at its heyday. Thus people allowed themselves to accept the war on Iraq. Not to say there weren’t ambivalent feelings, and people didn’t prefer a more diplomatic means of handling the conflict, but people allowed their patriotism to govern their final say. Certain details, such as there being no real evidence of ties between the 9/11 attacks to Saddam’s regime just didn’t seem to be that significant. The mood, the psychological plight of the public, was not one of cynicism and of questioning its commander and chief.

However, there then comes the unavoidable question of whether or not the media continued to build on this cycle by continuing to provide news coverage that furthered this attitude of the public, of Iraq being an unavoidable consequence of 9/11 and its support a manifestation of our patriotism. Had the media ventured and raised some real doubts in the press, perhaps the public would have shifted to embrace a more questioning, skeptical type of mindset. The media seemed to allow the propaganda put forth by the administration to reverberate and flourish. Perhaps at a certain point it was no longer reinforcing the people with what they already felt and had reached the point where it was governing and dictating people’s attitudes and opinions about the war. Rather than relay information that could’ve allowed people to doubt the war earlier on, the media didn’t want to abandon its already established take, and found it easier to continue down the path it already had established, or more sinisterly perhaps, the trap it had set for itself.

However, the media wasn’t just reporting directly to the mood of the public. It also reflected upon the opinions in our government. Democrats in Congress supported to the war, and only a minority within the government overtly voiced opposition. In the fall of 2002, 78 rcent of U.S. Senate voted in favor of the war. Thus, rather than risk offending its audience by emphasizing or hyping up anti-war opinions that at the time represented only the minority, the media actually downplayed some of the news and resorted to reporting what was popular opinion. At the brink of the war there was also a lack of a significant clash of opinions between Republicans and Democrats in Congress, and building a story or providing extensive or in depth analysis of the handful of strong anti-war opinions would perhaps cause them to be depicted with the notorious “liberal media bias” or even worse as unpatriotic. The media had no way of knowing that what then constituted the minority anti-war sentiment, would later emerge as popular mainstream opinion.

Thus, the few early voices who vocalized concern that the administration’s claims lacked substantial evidence, such as there being no Weapons of Mass Destruction, were downplayed because at the time the claims themselves were no more than speculations. News industries lacked the 0riginal intelligence report that served as the basis for Bush’s claim of nuclear weaponry. Since it was difficult to refute anything Bush said, legitimizing and giving credence to the early speculations and theories could entangle themselves in a political mess. Any such articles at the brink of the war would seem unpatriotic and overly cynical. It wasn’t until later in the war that the media began taking a different approach, but by then it was too late.

The media didn’t necessarily prefer Bush to any other administration. Unlike his predecessor, Bush emerged as a president in times of crises. The nature of the public to rally behind its leader in times of threats and wars is surely not a novelty, and neither is the tendency of the media to appeal to the public’s mainstream sentiment by providing news coverage with a tone deemed appropriate by the majority.
Thus, the media can only be held accountable to a certain extent. Fault lies in Washington-- in Congress-- within our own government for not investigating better the war being advertised by the Bush administration. Moderates with widespread appeal and competent leaders in prominent positions should have more proficiently examined the legitimacy of the war. They should have spoken up, assuming a braver stance and reported their initial ambivalence before the war even started; but only 22 percent voted against the war.
Nobody with realistic expectations could have expected the media to venture down a path that might prove unprofitable. But once significant discord existed, and legitimate authorities had begun stirring up questions, the media’s theoretical role as a public advocate could have become a possibility.